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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 
 This brief is filed on behalf of the undersigned 
Law Professors identified in the Appendix.1 
 Law Professors teach and write about patents, 
intellectual property, and constitutional law. Law Pro-
fessors are concerned that the Court should clearly 
state the requirements for an eligible invention 
modifying or applying a natural discovery. These are 
that: (1) the claim must be for a creative “inventive 
concept” that is not analogous to (is markedly differ-
ent from) the natural discovery’s structure and func-
tions; and (2) the ineligible discovery must be treated 
as if it were prior art when evaluating whether such 
an inventive concept exists. Given this standard, Law 
Professors are concerned that thousands of claimed 
DNA molecules based on discovered gene sequences – 
including those at issue – have never been patent 
eligible inventions but have been issued as patents 
that have chilled scientific and medical innovation. 
This Court should clarify the standard for eligibility 
to avoid needless and costly litigation and foregone 
innovation. 
---------------------------------  ---------------------------------   
 
 1 The Petitioners’ letter of consent for amicus briefs is on 
file with the Court; the Respondents’ emailed consent accompa-
nies this brief. This brief was not authored in whole or in part by 
counsel for any party. No one other than Amici and their counsel 
made a monetary contribution to preparing or submitting this 
brief. 
2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, this Court reiterated that to be a patent 
eligible invention under Section 101 of the Patent Act, 
a claimed application of a natural discovery must 
reflect an “ ‘inventive concept.’ ” In the 1952 Act, 
Congress restored for process claims this Court’s 
“non-analogous” structure and function standard 
from Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. v. Electric Supply 
Co. When doing so, Congress also codified the corre-
sponding “markedly different” standard for modified 
products of nature, later applied in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty. The non-analogous structure and 
function standard properly distinguishes eligible from 
ineligible applications or modifications of natural 
discoveries. The standard has a long history dating to 
the 1793 Patent Act. To avoid further confusion, this 
Court should clarify its dicta suggesting that merely 
avoiding preemption or that artificial, human crea-
tion alone is sufficient for eligibility. The Court also 
should clarify that the presence or absence of a non-
analogous inventive concept must be determined 
using a two-way test of the significance of the differ-
ences from the ineligible discovery and the other 
claim limits. 
 As this Court reiterated in Bilski v. Kappos and 
recognized in Mayo, Section 101 codified the rule 
adopted by this Court in O’Reilly v. Morse that treats 
ineligible natural discoveries as prior art. This rule 
assures that the claim is properly evaluated to assess 
whether it reflects an original inventive concept. This 
3 
Court should state explicitly that such prior art 
treatment is a Constitutional requirement. 
 Given the prior art treatment of the discovered 
natural gene sequences and molecules, the claimed 
“isolated DNA” molecules at issue clearly are not 
“markedly different” and are not patent eligible. 
Structurally, they are at most analogous to natural 
DNA and mRNA. Isolating the claimed DNA mole-
cules is not (and was not) a creative advance beyond 
the ineligible scientific discovery. Functionally, new 
medical and scientific uses of the claimed molecules 
rely upon analogous, natural processes of sequence 
binding and replication. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Court Should Clarify That An 
“Inventive Concept” Requires Non-
Analogous (Markedly Different) Creativity 
In The Modification Or Application Of 
Natural Discoveries. 
 In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012), this Court 
reiterated that to be a patent eligible invention, a 
claimed application of an ineligible natural discovery2 
 
 2 See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) 
(“ ‘laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas’ ” are 
not patent-eligible inventions) (citations omitted). The exclusions 
for natural discoveries are not, in fact, “exceptions” to statutory 
(Continued on following page) 
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must reflect an “ ‘inventive concept.’ ” Id. at 1294 
(quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)). 
The very concept of “invention” requires a creative, 
human advance on prior knowledge or pre-existing 
nature. See, e.g., 1 William C. Robinson, The Law of 
Patents for Useful Inventions, §§ 77, 78, at 116-17 
(Little, Brown 1890) (“The application of an idea, not 
original with the person who applies it, is not an 
invention. . . . The mental faculties involved in the 
inventive act are the creative not the imitative facul-
ties. . . . [S]kill in applying [others’ ideas] to practical 
results; none of these are creation. . . .) (first and last 
emphasis added). 
 Once a discovery of a law of nature has been 
made, an inventive concept (a creative advance) can 
occur (if at all) only in the application of such a 
discovery. See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294 (“Still, as the 
Court has also made clear, to transform an 
unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible 
application of such a law, one must do more than 
simply state the law of nature while adding the words 
‘apply it.’ ”). Similarly, to be a patent eligible inven-
tion reflecting an inventive concept, a claimed prod-
uct modifying a discovered product of nature must 
have “markedly different characteristics from any 
found in nature and . . . the potential for significant 
 
subject matter. Id. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1553 n.13 
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Archer, C.J., dissenting) (“Defining 
patentable subject matter is the raison d’être of § 101.”). 
5 
utility.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 
(1980) (emphasis added). 
 Although the Court has used different language 
to address processes applying scientific discoveries 
and products modifying natural material discoveries, 
it has always required that the “inventive concept” 
reflect more than the mere application of a discovery 
to a new “field of use,” object, or purpose, and more 
than the “obvious” or “conventional,” “token, post-
solution” application or modification of a scientific 
principle or natural material. See, e.g., Mayo, 132 
S.Ct. at 1301; Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3231. Novelty and 
utility of an application or modification alone have 
never been sufficient to establish an eligible, in-
ventive concept. See, e.g., Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. 
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1948) (Bond 
“made an new and different composition of non-
inhibitive strains which contributed utility and 
economy to the manufacture and distribution of 
commercial inoculants. But we think that that aggre-
gation of species fell short of invention within the 
meaning of the patent statutes.”).3 
 
 3 See 1 Robinson, supra, § 70, at 108 (Little, Brown 1890) 
(“[T]he novelty and utility of the result of the inventive act [are] 
additional conditions of patentability. The language of our 
courts might sometimes lead the incautious reader to imagine 
that the novelty and utility here required were to be taken as 
the tests by which the presence or the absence of the inventive 
act could always be determined. Yet such is not the case.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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 The Court, however, has not been sufficiently 
clear regarding what is meant by an “inventive 
concept.” The Court in this case should provide the 
needed further guidance for lower courts, patent 
examiners, and the public. Such guidance will avoid 
unnecessary litigation and foregone sequential inno-
vation resulting from improperly granting patents to 
purported inventions lacking an inventive concept. 
Such purported inventions add nothing to the 
“ ‘storehouse of knowledge’ ” beyond what should be 
“ ‘free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.’ ” 
Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3225 (quoting Funk Bros., 333 
U.S. at 130). 
 Specifically, the Court should clarify that an 
“inventive concept” requires a creative, non-analogous 
modification or application of an ineligible natural 
discovery. In other words, the inventive concept must 
possess a markedly different structure and function 
from the ineligible discovery. Otherwise, the claim to 
the purported invention will effectively protect the 
discovery itself, even if it does not claim all modifica-
tions and applications thereof. See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 
1297 (“If a law of nature is not patentable, then 
neither is a process reciting a law of nature, unless 
that process has additional features that provide 
practical assurance that the process is more than a 
drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of 
nature itself.”) (emphasis added). 
 In 1952, Congress codified in Section 101 this 
Court’s non-analogous structure and function (mark-
edly different) standard for eligibility, which the 
7 
Court had long established as the means to avoid 
such monopolization. Without non-analogous creativi-
ty, natural discoveries could be monopolized in small 
bites (rather than swallowed whole) by claims to 
narrow but uncreative applications or modifications. 
The non-analogous structure and function standard 
also avoids the reductio ad absurdum that patents 
would never issue to claims applying or modifying 
natural discoveries. Rather, the standard assures 
that patents protect only the creative human contri-
bution beyond what should be freely available. 
 Relatedly, the Court should clarify its dicta 
regarding concerns about “preemption,” originating 
with Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). See id. 
at 72 (“if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent 
would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula 
and in practical effect would be a patent on the 
algorithm itself ”). See also, e.g., Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 
1294; Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3230. These statements can 
be misconstrued to suggest that merely claiming a 
limited scope of application or modification of a 
natural discovery is sufficient for eligibility, even 
without an inventive concept. The Court also should 
clarify its dicta originating with Chakrabarty, which 
can be misconstrued to suggest that artificial, human 
creation alone is sufficient for eligibility. See 447 U.S. 
at 313 (“Congress thus recognized that the relevant 
distinction was not between living and inanimate 
things, but between products of nature, whether 
living or not, and human-made inventions.”). See also, 
e.g., J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 
Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 130 (2002). Non-preemption and 
8 
artificiality are necessary but not sufficient condi-
tions for eligibility. See, e.g., Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 
130-31. Conversely, limiting eligibility to non-
analogous applications or modifications of natural 
discoveries necessarily avoids preemption and as-
sures artificial creation. 
 The Court also should clarify the method of 
assessing claims for the presence or absence of a non-
analogous inventive concept. Because all inventions 
are essentially combinations of pre-existing elements, 
non-analogousness should be determined using a two-
way test of the significance of the differences from 
both the underlying natural discovery and the other 
claim limitations. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, 
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418-19 (2007) (“inventions in most, 
if not all, instances rely upon building blocks . . . and 
claimed discoveries almost of necessity will be combi-
nations of what, in some sense, is already known.”); 
Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 946 F.2d 821, 
842 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“ ‘Virtually all inventions are 
combinations and virtually all are combinations of old 
elements.’ ”) (citation omitted). The two-way test as-
sures that the existence of an inventive concept will be 
properly assessed regardless of the form of the claim. 
 
A. Section 101 Codified This Court’s Prec-
edents Requiring a Non-Analogous 
“Inventive Concept” for Eligibility. 
 In 1952, Congress made two significant changes 
to the requirements for patent eligible and patentable 
  
9 
inventions. First, in the only directly relevant change 
to the law of patent eligibility, Congress overruled 
dicta from In re Thuau, 135 F.2d 344, 347 (C.C.P.A. 
1943), which had been construed in later cases to 
suggest that no new use of an existing process or 
thing could constitute an eligible invention. See, e.g., 
Pasquale J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent 
Act, 75 J. Pat & Trademark Off. Soc’y 161, 177-78 
(1993) (1954) (noting that Thuau held only that 
existing compositions of matter could not be consid-
ered new inventions and claimed as such simply 
because a new use for them had been found, “al-
though some of the statements made in the decision 
are not completely defensible”). Congress did so by 
adopting in Section 100(b) of the new act a definition 
of “process,” one of the four categories of patent 
eligible subject matter recited in Section 101 and its 
predecessors. That definition states that a statutory 
process “includes a new use of a known process, 
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or 
material.” 35 U.S.C. § 100(b).4 
 As the legislative history of Section 100(b) noted, 
moreover, “[t]he definition of process has been added 
 
 4 To simplify drafting, Congress also provided a definition  
of invention that includes inventions and discoveries. See 35 
U.S.C. §§ 100(a), 101. Congress did not thereby intend to alter 
long-standing eligibility standards. Inclusion of the word “dis-
covery” in the definition does not merit any significance, as the 
“invented or discovered” language has been in the Patent Act 
since its inception. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1 Stat. 109 
(Apr. 10, 1790). 
10 
. . . to clarify the present law as to the patentability of 
certain types of processes or methods as to which some 
insubstantial doubts have been expressed.” H.R. Rep. 
No. 82-1923, at 6 (emphasis added). This change was 
understood at the time to have been limited to restor-
ing the Supreme Court’s standard for the eligibility 
of process claims for new uses under the 1870 Act, 
which the lower courts had wrongly limited. Specifi-
cally, Congress intended to restore the non-analogous 
use standard this Court had articulated in Ansonia 
Brass & Copper Co. v. Electric Supply Co., 144 U.S. 
11 (1892). See, e.g., Stefan A. Reisenfeld, The New 
United States Patent Act in the Light of Comparative 
Law I, 102 U. Penn. L. Rev. 291, 299-300 (1954) 
(“[T]he background of the amendment gives reason to 
assume that a newly discovered use for a known 
substance, machine or process is still only patentable 
if it is not merely analogous or cognate to the uses 
heretofore made.... [I]n essence the new statutory 
definition of ‘process’ restores the broad principles of 
patentability flowing from a careful analysis of the 
exposition given by the Supreme Court in the Ansonia 
case.”) (emphasis added). This was confirmed in Appli-
cation of Ducci, 225 F.2d 683, 688 (C.C. P.A. 1955). 
 Ansonia Brass had held that “nothing is better 
settled in this court than that the application of an 
old process to a new and analogous purpose does not 
involve invention, even if the new result had not be-
fore been contemplated.” Id. at 18 (emphasis added). 
See George T. Curtis, A Treatise on the Law of Pa-
tents for Useful Inventions in the United States of 
11 
America § 87, at 120 (Little Brown 2d ed. 1854) (“the 
new occasion or purpose . . . [must] not be merely 
analogous to the former occasions or purposes”). As 
discussed below, the Court’s non-analogous structure 
and function standard for determining if an invention 
exists (and the corresponding “markedly different” 
standard for products modifying natural phenomena) 
dates to cases decided under the 1793 Act. Given the 
long history of that eligibility standard and the 
contemporaneous understanding to restore it, Section 
100(b) should be understood to have codified the non-
analogous use standard for process claims. See H.R. 
Rep. No. 82-1923, at 1 (“[T]he purpose of the bill is to 
revise and codify the laws relating to patents. . . .”). 
To hold otherwise would attribute to the 1952 Con-
gress an intent to repeal centuries of settled doctrine 
without any discussion thereof. 
 Section 100(b), moreover, has no application 
whatsoever to product claims (machines, manufac-
tures, and compositions of matter). Had Congress 
in 1952 intended any change to the standard for 
eligibility of products, Congress could have and 
would have said so (as it did for processes in Section 
100(b)). Accordingly, the 1952 Act codified the Court’s 
consistent, earlier interpretations of the relevant 
requirements for eligibility of products. See, e.g., 
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994); Lorillard v. Pons, 
434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978). 
 The second, and indirectly relevant, change 
adopted by Congress in 1952 was to create a new 
patentability standard to address the degree of 
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creative advance required for eligible inventions. 
Congress created a separate section (Section 103) 
with new language (obviousness) to determine 
whether the degree of creative advance reflected by 
an invention warranted granting a patent. In enact-
ing Section 103, Congress was responding to the 
uncertainty that had been created regarding the 
degree of creativity required after Cuno Engineering 
Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941). 
See Federico, supra, at 183-84. See also Graham v. 
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1966) (holding that 
Congress did not change the required degree of crea-
tivity when adopting Section 103). 
 Section 103, however, applies only to inventions 
that are determined to be eligible under Section 101. 
See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (“A patent may not be 
obtained though the invention is not identically 
disclosed or described as set forth in Section 102”) 
(emphasis added); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). Nothing in 
Section 103 changed the law regarding what qualifies 
as an invention in the first instance. But cf. Giles S. 
Rich, Laying the Ghost of the “Invention” Requirement, 
1 APLA Q.J. 26, 29 (1972-73) (“[F]or the century 
following Hotchkiss v. Greenwood[, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 
248 (1851),] we had what was called the ‘requirement 
for invention,’ which, I emphasize, we have not had 
for the past twenty years. Instead we have § 103.”). 
 In particular, Congress when adopting Section 
103 did not change the eligibility requirements in 
Section 101 for claims that modify or apply ineligible 
discoveries of nature. As this Court recognized in 
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Mayo (and as discussed in Section II below), natural 
discoveries are to be treated as if they were prior art 
against the applicant when determining if an inven-
tion has been made. However, nothing in Section 102 
or in Section 103 treats natural discoveries as if they 
were prior art, or even excludes them from being 
patented. See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1304 (“But §§ 102 
and 103 say nothing about treating laws of nature as 
if they were part of the prior art when applying those 
sections.”). The requirement for prior art treatment of 
natural discoveries, and thus their ineligibility and 
the need for an inventive concept in applying or 
modifying them, remains exclusive to Section 101. 
For this reason, Section 101 both is critically im-
portant and does not duplicate the obviousness 
standard of Section 103. See generally Joshua D. 
Sarnoff, Patent Eligible Inventions After Bilski: 
History and Theory, 63 Hastings L.J. 53, 56-58, 101-
10 (2011). 
 
B. The Non-Analogous (Markedly Differ-
ent) Structure and Function Standard 
for Determining “Invention” Has Ex-
isted Since the 1793 Act. 
 The non-analogousness standard adopted by the 
Court in Ansonia Brass had a long history, for both 
products and processes. See, e.g., Sarnoff, supra, at 
63-84. In the 1793 Act, Congress confirmed the ap-
proach adopted by the Patent Board under the 1790 
Act, excluding from a patent-eligible “discovery” a 
“simpl[e] chang[e to the] form or proportions” of 
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machines or compositions of matter. Patent Act of 
1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (Feb. 21, 1793). 
Under that Act, lower courts first confirmed for 
American law the exclusion of natural discoveries 
from the patent system. See, e.g., Lowell v. Lewis, 15 
F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C. D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568) 
(“It has been often decided, that a patent cannot be 
legally obtained for a mere philosophical5 or abstract 
theory.”). Cf. Boulton v. Bull, 126 Eng. Rep. 651, 667 
(1795) (Lord Eyre, C.J.) (no patents for “mere princi-
ple[s]”); id. at 663 (Buller, J.) (no patents for “an idea 
or principle alone”). The lower courts then confirmed 
that an eligible invention required the creation of a 
non-analogous thing or method (although the exis-
tence of an invention was sometimes conflated with 
the question of its novelty).6 See, e.g., Whitney v. 
Emmitt, 29 F. Cas. 1074, 1078 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1831) 
(No. 17,585) (“if the patent is for [a new manufac-
ture], it must be for something substantially new, 
different from what was before known; if [for a new 
manner of producing an old manufacture], the mode 
of operation must be different, not a mere change of 
the form and proportions; if both are the same in 
principle, structure, mode of operation, and produce 
the same result, they are not new, though there may 
 
 5 “Philosophical” was then understood to mean pertaining 
to the natural sciences. See, e.g., The Compact Edition of the 
Oxford English Dictionary 180 (Oxford Univ. Press 1971). 
 6 See generally Edward C. Walterscheid, Novelty and the 
Hotchkiss Standard, 20 Fed. Cir. B.J. 219, 227-28 (2010) 
(discussing “substantial novelty” and citing cases). 
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be a variance in some small matter for the purpose of 
evasion”) (emphasis added). 
 In the 1836 Patent Act, Congress removed the 
statutory language regarding changes to form and 
proportions. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 
Stat. 117, 119 (July 4, 1836). Nevertheless, under that 
Act, this Court reconfirmed in Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 
U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1853), that natural discoveries 
are excluded from patent eligibility. See id. at 175 
(“no one can claim in . . . [principles in the abstract] 
an exclusive right.”). The Court then explained in 
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854) – 
relying on the English precedent of Nielson v. Har-
ford, 151 Eng. Rep. 1266 (1841) – that such natural 
discoveries are to be treated as if they were prior art 
(not as inventions of their discoverers) when evaluat-
ing the existence (or not) of an invention. See 56 U.S. 
(15 How.) at 116 (in Nielson “it was finally decided 
that this [discovered] principle [of physical science 
that hot air will promote fuel ignition better than 
cold] must be regarded as well known, and that the 
plaintiff had invented a mechanical mode of applying 
it to furnaces . . . [T]he court emphatically denied this 
[argued] right to such a patent [for the natural dis-
covery itself ].”) (emphasis added). Finally, this Court 
and lower courts continued to require non-analogous 
new things or new uses for an invention to exist. See, 
e.g., Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 175, 177 (“the invention is not 
in discovering the[ elements of the power], but in 
applying them to useful objects. . . . ‘If it is old and 
well known, and applied only to a new purpose, that 
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does not make it patentable.’ ”) (quoting Bean v. 
Smallwood, 2 F. Cas. 1142 (C.C. D. Mass. 1843) (No. 
1,173)) (emphasis added); Howe v. Abbott, 12 F. Cas. 
656, 658 (C.C. D. Mass. 1842) (No. 6,766) (“The 
application of an old process to manufacture an 
article, to which it had never before been applied, is 
not a patentable invention.”) (emphasis added). 
 In the 1870 Act, Congress did not make any 
relevant change to the eligibility requirements, 
preserving the Court’s interpretations of the limits of 
an eligible “invention.” See Patent Act of 1870, ch. 
230, § 24, 16 Stat. 200 (July 8, 1870). Shortly before 
Ansonia Brass, the Court reiterated in The Telephone 
Cases that more than mere application of a natural 
discovery to a new use was required for eligibility. See 
Dolbear v. American Bell Telephone Co., 126 U.S. 1, 
534 (1888) (“In the present case the claim is not for 
the use of a current of electricity in its natural state 
as it comes from the battery . . . but for putting a 
continuous current, in a closed circuit, into a certain 
specified condition. . . .”). Similarly, as stated by the 
Court of Appeals in Wall v. Leck, 66 F. 552 (9th Cir. 
1895): 
[E]mployment of [a scientific discovery] in 
the modes or through the instrumentalities 
by which it is applied in nature is a mere 
limitation of what every man is able to per-
ceive and reproduce as well as [t]he [patent-
ee]. All endeavors to confine it to himself are 
at once futile and unjust. . . . Not until some 
new instrument or method is contrived for its 
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direction towards ends which it cannot natu-
rally accomplish does his creative genius 
manifest itself. 
Id. at 558 (citing 1 Robinson, supra, § 136) (emphasis 
added). 
 Although this Court when addressing modified 
products of nature (“natural phenomena” or “physical 
phenomena”7) used different terminology, it also 
required for invention a non-analogous structure and 
function. For example, in Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 
U.S. 609 (1887), the Court held that to qualify as a 
manufacture required “a new and different article, 
having a distinctive name, character, or use. . . . The 
application of labor to an article, either by hand or by 
mechanism, does not make the article necessarily a 
manufactured article. . . .” Id. at 615. Similarly, in 
American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 
1 (1931), the Court addressed a novel and useful (but 
structurally and functionally analogous) borax-
treated preserved fruit. The Court held that for 
invention to exist “a new and different article must 
emerge.” Id. at 13 (emphasis added). Given the 
known preservative functions of borax and the food 
function of fruit, making the novel and useful struc-
tural combination was not an invention. See id. at 14. 
 As the Commissioner of the Patent Office (and 
one of the principal drafters of the 1952 Patent Act) 
 
 7 See, e.g., Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1293 (citations omitted); 
Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3225 (citations omitted). 
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recognized shortly after American Fruit Growers, 
some patents had been improperly issued under the 
1870 Act (such as Pasteur’s yeast patent) for isolated 
or purified natural products that lacked the requisite 
marked differences of structure and function. See 
Pasquale J. Federico, Louis Pasteur’s Patents, 86 
Science 327 (October 8, 1937) (“A claim of this type 
would now probably be refused by the examiner, since 
it may now be doubted that the subject-matter is 
capable of being patented.”).8 
 Just prior to the 1952 Act, moreover, this Court 
reaffirmed that invention required a creative, non-
analogous inventive concept, not merely novelty and 
utility. The bacterial cultures at issue in Funk Broth-
ers were both structurally novel (as they had not 
previously been combined) and had valuable new uses 
(because of the natural discovery of the non-inhibition 
 
 8 The comparison to the instant case is apt, although the 
magnitude of the granting errors is much greater in regard to 
gene patents. Further, isolated and purified natural products 
may become eligible if they have become non-analogous things. 
Cf. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 
(S.D.N.Y. 1911) (finding isolated and purified adrenaline to be a 
change of kind rather than of degree from the natural substance, 
but adopting unfortunate dicta that “even if it were merely an 
extracted product without change, there is no rule that such 
products are not patentable”), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, 196 F. 
496 (2d Cir. 1912)); Jon M. Harkness, Dicta on Adrenalin(e): 
Myriad Problems With Learned Hand’s Product of Nature 
Pronouncements in Parke-Davis v. Mulford, 93 J. Pat. & Trade-
mark Off. Soc’y 363, 389-92 (2011) (noting Judge Hand’s lack of 
attention to the product of nature issue given the case focus on 
novelty). 
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property of the strains). Nevertheless, the Court held 
the combination to lack the required inventive con-
cept beyond merely applying the new discovery. See 
Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131 (“The aggregation of 
select strains of the several species into one product 
is an application of that newly-discovered natural 
principle. But however ingenious the [scientific] 
discovery of that natural principle may have been, the 
application of it is hardly more than an advance in 
the packaging of the inoculants.”) (emphasis added). 
Cf. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 
306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939) (“We assume, without deciding 
the point, that this advance was invention even 
though it was achieved by the logical application of a 
known scientific law to a familiar type of antenna.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 
C. The Court Should Clarify Its Dicta 
Suggesting that Merely Avoiding 
Preemption or Artificial, Human Crea-
tion Is Sufficient for Eligibility. 
 As the Court recently noted in Mayo, its prece-
dents establish three concerns. First, eligibility 
requires a claimed process applying a natural law to 
reflect an inventive concept that “in practice amounts 
to significantly more than a patent on the natural law 
itself.” 132 S.Ct. at 1294 (citations omitted). Second, 
eligibility should not “ ‘depend simply on the drafts-
man’s art’ without reference to the ‘principles under-
lying the prohibition against patents for [natural 
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laws].’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Third, courts should 
not “uphold[ ]  patents that claim processes that too 
broadly preempt the use of a natural law.” Id. The 
first concern is met by the non-analogous (markedly 
different) structure and function standard. The 
second concern is met by proper implementation of 
that standard, which requires both prior art treat-
ment of ineligible discoveries and a two-way test of 
the significance of the differences from the prior art 
(as discussed below). However, the Court’s third 
concern can lead to significant confusion. 
 The lack of inventive creativity and scope of 
preemption are entirely different concerns, and only 
the former is relevant for eligibility determinations. 
See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Much Ado About 
Preemption, 50 Hous. L. Rev. 563, 564-67 (2012) 
(discussing use of “preemption” as a measure of the 
effects of claims on downstream innovation; noting 
that most of the Court’s eligibility decisions turn not 
on overbreadth but on whether the “application of per 
se unpatentable elements is sufficiently inventive to 
traverse the boundary between unpatentable and 
patentable terrain”). The Court’s dicta, unfortunately, 
have sometimes conflated these two concerns. See, 
e.g., Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1301 (“the claim [in Benson] 
(like the claims before us) was overly broad; it did not 
differ significantly from a claim that just said ‘apply 
the algorithm.’ ”). 
 The Court thus should clarify that its concern 
about preemption of innovation is not a test for 
  
21 
determining eligibility of claims applying or modify-
ing ineligible natural discoveries. Rather, preemption 
was one of the historical motivating reasons for 
finding natural discoveries to be ineligible in the first 
instance. See Sarnoff, supra, at 85-90 (tracing reli-
gious concerns over patenting “God’s work” that 
corresponded with utilitarian views that private 
ownership of natural discoveries would be bad inno-
vation policy). As this Court held in The Telephone 
Cases, if an eligible, inventive concept is present in a 
claim applying a natural discovery, then the claim can 
preempt the entire scope of application of that con-
cept (not of the discovery).9 See Dolbear, 126 U.S. at 
534-35 (“It may be that . . . practically, [Bell’s] patent 
gives him its exclusive use for [transmitting speech 
by electricity], but that does not make his claim one 
for the use of electricity distinct from the particular 
process. . . . It will, if true, show more clearly the 
great importance of his [creative human] discovery, 
but it will not invalidate his patent.”). A creative 
invention, just like a law of nature, may be either 
broad or narrow; a claim to the former may preempt 
 
 9 See, e.g., 1 Robinson, supra, § 81, at 124 & n.3 (“The law 
regards him as the owner of the invention for any and every 
purpose to which it can be applied, and thus secures to him the 
entire benefit of his original idea. . . . [This] doctrine is, there-
fore, limited to such benefits as the inventive skill of the inventor 
in question has actually conferred upon the public. . . .”) (empha-
sis added). The scope of application of inventions is currently 
limited only by the reverse doctrine of equivalents. See Westing-
house v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 571, 573 (1898). 
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its full scope, while a claim to the latter is simply 
ineligible. Cf. Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1303.10 
 The Court’s dicta, moreover, can easily be mis-
construed to suggest that merely avoiding preemption 
of a natural discovery is sufficient for eligibility. 
For example, if avoiding preemption of all uses of 
Einstein’s discovery were sufficient for eligibility, the 
hypothetical claim discussed in Mayo should be 
eligible. See 132 S.Ct. at 1297 (instructing linear 
accelerators to refer to Einstein’s mass-energy conver-
sion law to determine “how much energy an amount 
of mass has produced (or vice-versa).”). That is because 
use in linear accelerators to determine mass-energy 
conversions would be only one, very small subset of 
applications of Einstein’s law, employing a specific, 
complex machine to achieve a new, particular, and 
 
 10 To the extent the Court remains concerned over the 
effects on downstream innovation of granting broad patents for 
eligible inventions, it may wish to revisit in an appropriate case 
the recent radical restriction of the scope of the experimental 
use “exception” to infringement. See, e.g., Roche Prods. Inc. v. 
Bolar Pharms., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Madey v. Duke 
Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Cf. Proveris Scientific Corp 
v. InnovaSystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2008). His-
torically, that doctrine prevented research on and with patented 
inventions from being considered infringing acts, permitting un-
restricted, further discovery, invention, and innovation. See gen-
erally Henrik Holzapfel & Joshua D. Sarnoff, A Cross-Atlantic 
Dialog on Experimental Use and Research Tools, 48 IDEA 123, 
133-44 (2008) (discussing the history of the doctrine). 
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valuable use.11 Rather, the reason such a claim is 
ineligible is that the use claimed is directly analogous 
to the natural discovery, and thus there is no creative 
inventive concept in that application. 
 Similarly, the ineligible claim actually at issue in 
Mayo would not have become eligible simply by 
avoiding preemption of all (or most) uses of the dis-
covered correlation. For example, it would add no 
creativity to limit the claim to the conventional 
treatment step of actually adjusting the dose of the 
synthetic drugs administered, but the claim may 
routinely be practiced without that added step (e.g., 
in diagnosis, for further study, etc.). Cf. id. at 1298 
(“the combination amounts to nothing significantly 
more than an instruction to doctors to apply the 
applicable laws when treating their patients.”). But 
cf. id. at 1303 (“the patent claims do not confine their 
reach to particular applications of those laws.”). 
 Clarifying that preemption is not directly rele-
vant to determining eligibility will discourage claim 
drafting efforts seeking to limit the scope of applica-
tion of natural discoveries without adding creativity, 
in an effort to evade this Court’s historic limits on 
eligibility codified by Section 101. Cf. Mayo, 132 S.Ct. 
at 1297 (“the ‘prohibition against patenting abstract 
ideas “cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit 
 
 11 The example demonstrates that this Court properly 
rejected the “machine-or-transformation” approach as a test of 
eligibility in Bilski. See 130 S.Ct. at 3226-27. 
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the use of the formula to a particular technological 
environment.” ’ ”) (citations omitted); id. at 1300 
(“ ‘ “Flook established that . . . adding token post-
solution components did not make the concept pa-
tentable.” ’ ”) (citations omitted). It will thereby also 
avoid unnecessary litigation over patents that lack an 
inventive concept but monopolize only some, not all, 
of the ineligible discovery itself. 
 Similarly, this Court should clarify that its dicta 
distinguishing artificial, human creations from dis-
covered products of nature state a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for eligibility. See Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. at 313 (“human-made inventions.”). Again, 
this dicta could readily be misconstrued to suggest 
that mere artificial, human applications or modifica-
tions of natural discoveries are eligible. Were mere 
artificiality sufficient, many of this Court’s precedents 
could not be justified. For example, in Mayo, the 
thiopurine drugs administered as part of the claims 
were synthetic human creations, and as the Court 
noted “[w]hile it takes a human action (the admin-
istration of a thiopurine drug) to trigger a manifesta-
tion of this relation in a particular person, the 
relation itself exists in principle apart from any 
human action.” 132 S.Ct. at 1297. The treated fruit in 
American Fruit Growers and the combined bacterial 
strains in Funk Brothers were artificial, human 
creations. So was synthetic alizarine, which the Court 
expressly held in Cochrane v. Badische Analin & 
Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293 (1884), was not an eligible 
invention merely because claimed as an artificial 
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preparation. See id. at 311 (“Calling it artificial 
alizarine did not make it a new composition of matter, 
and patentable as such, by reason of its having been 
prepared artificially”) (citing American Wood Paper 
Co. v. The Fibre Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 
566, 593 (1874)). 
 The Court thus should clarify that inventions 
must not only be “human-made,” but also markedly 
different from natural products. As with clarifying 
preemption dicta, the Court will help to avoid further 
improper patent grants, further efforts to evade 
eligibility limits, and further unnecessary litigation. 
 
D. The Court Should Adopt a Two-Way 
Test of the Significance of the Differ-
ences from the Natural Discovery. 
 Although this Court’s dicta have sometimes 
conflated the questions of whether an inventive 
concept is present and whether preemption exists, the 
Court has properly looked for an inventive concept 
from both perspectives of the claimed combinations: 
how do the additional elements of the claim creatively 
apply or modify an ineligible natural discovery; and 
what does the discovery add to an existing product or 
process. For example, as the Court discussed in Mayo, 
Flook involved an ineligible claim combining an 
ineligible mathematical equation (treated as if it were 
prior art) with a known process for catalytic conver-
sion of hydrocarbons. See 132 S.Ct. at 1299. The 
Court in Flook sought to determine eligibility first by 
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noting that the claim did not provide any guidance 
regarding how the elements of the process worked 
with the ineligible formula (and thus “did not limit 
the claim to a particular application” of the discov-
ery), and second by analyzing the nature of the pro-
cess limitations added to the ineligible formula 
(which were “ ‘well known’ to the point where, putting 
the formula to the side, there was no ‘inventive 
concept’ ”). Id. (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 594). 
 This two-way analysis of non-analogousness is 
the proper approach. The structures and functions 
identified in nature may not by themselves suggest 
combination with an existing process or product, but 
that process or product may itself suggest the combi-
nation when the natural discovery is similar to exist-
ing structures and functions already employed. For 
example, the Pythagorean theorem by itself may not 
have been applied in architecture prior to its discov-
ery, and thus its discovery may not have suggested 
combination with rulers and compasses to make 
diagrams. But given prior calculations to make 
diagrams, substituting the theorem (once discovered 
and treated as prior art) would have been directly 
analogous (even if novel and highly useful) to existing 
architectural processes. No inventive concept would 
exist in claiming the theorem’s use for this purpose. 
 Similarly, as this Court also discussed in Mayo, 
the claimed process in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 
175 (1981), was found eligible 
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because of the way the additional steps of the 
process integrated the equation into the pro-
cess as a whole. . . . [The Court] nowhere 
suggested that all these steps, or at least the 
combination of those steps, were in context 
obvious, already in use, or purely conven-
tional. . . . These other steps apparently add-
ed to the formula something that in terms of 
patent law’s objectives had significance – 
they transformed the process into an in-
ventive application of the formula. 
132 S.Ct. at 1298-99 (emphasis added).12 Again, 
the Court applied a two-way analysis for a non-
analogous inventive concept: adding the discovery to 
something and the other way around. One-way non-
analogousness is not enough. 
 The two-way test for an inventive concept makes 
eminent sense, given prior-art treatment of ineligible 
discoveries. Either the discoveries or the elements 
they are combined with may suggest making a 
claimed combination (as may extrinsic motivations, 
alternative problems, or ordinary human practices). 
See, e.g., KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 418-22. The two-way 
analysis, moreover, should make it easier to deter-
mine the presence or absence of an inventive concept 
 
 12 This holding, however, was highly questionable given 
that similar rubber curing processes not continuously monitor-
ing temperature, but using the same equation, had been in use. 
See 450 U.S. at 179. The Court would assist understanding and 
avoid untold future litigation if it simply acknowledged here 
that Diehr was wrongly decided. 
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regardless of the form of the claim as a process or as a 
product (machine or system, manufacture, or compo-
sition of matter). In all cases, the question will be 
what the functional or structural claim limits crea-
tively add to the natural discovery and what the 
ineligible discovery creatively adds to prior art pro-
cesses or things. So long as the two-way test of non-
analogousness is employed, the Court can leave for 
further judicial and administrative development the 
requisite degree of creative advance that will estab-
lish non-analogousness in particular cases. 
 
II. The Court Should Reaffirm That Ineligi-
ble Discoveries Must Be Treated As Prior 
Art When Evaluating The Presence Or Ab-
sence Of An Inventive Concept. 
 In Bilski, the Court reiterated language originat-
ing in O’Reilly that natural discoveries must be 
treated as if they were prior art for eligibility. “The 
Court concluded [in Flook] that the process at issue 
there was ‘unpatentable under § 101, not because it 
contain[ed] a mathematical algorithm as one component, 
but because once that algorithm [wa]s assumed to be 
within the prior art, the application, considered as a 
whole, contain[ed] no patentable invention.’ ” Id. at 
3230 (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 594) (emphasis 
added). See Flook, 437 U.S. at 595 (“If we assume 
that that method was also known, as we must under 
the reasoning in Morse”); O’Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 
at 115-16. The Court, however, has failed to empha-
size the significance of prior art treatment or to 
29 
explain why it is needed for determining whether an 
inventive concept exists. It should do so here. 
 
A. Without Prior Art Treatment, Any 
Claimed Modification or Application 
of an Ineligible Discovery Can Mas-
querade As an Inventive Concept. 
 Although “the discovery of . . . a [natural] phe-
nomenon cannot support a patent,” it is prior art 
treatment of ineligible discoveries that mandates that 
“there [be] some other inventive concept in [their] 
application.” Flook, 347 U.S. at 594 (emphasis added). 
This is true even when considering a claimed inven-
tion “as a whole.” Id. Otherwise, the creative advance 
of the discovery itself may be improperly viewed as 
the “inventive concept” of any claim that modifies or 
applies it. See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192 (“To hold 
otherwise would allow a competent draftsman to 
evade the recognized limitations on the type of sub-
ject matter eligible. . . .”); Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1554 
(Archer, C.J., dissenting) (“The discovery of music 
does not become patentable subject matter simply 
because there is an arbitrary claim to some struc-
ture.”). This is because it may take creativity to 
discover the ineligible product of nature or scientific 
principle but not to combine it (once known) with the 
existing art. 
 For example, without prior art treatment, substi-
tuting a new algorithm for analogous timing calcula-
tions in a hydrocarbon cracking process might appear 
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to be an inventive concept, even if the only creative 
advance were in the ineligible algorithm. Conversely, 
adding the cracking process to the algorithm might 
appear to be a creative advance without prior art 
treatment, particularly if the algorithm was not 
discovered in (and thus did not suggest its use in) the 
context of cracking. By treating the ineligible discov-
ery as prior art, both the algorithm and its properties 
will already be taken into account when assessing 
whether its substitution into an existing process is a 
creative, non-analogous advance. 
 
B. The Court Should Explicitly Hold That 
Prior Art Treatment Is a Constitution-
al Requirement. 
 Prior art treatment of ineligible discoveries is no 
mere historical accident. Through the late 18th 
century, “invention” had a technical meaning that 
distinguished it from discoveries of scientific princi-
ples, natural phenomena, and fundamental information 
(as well as from discoveries of exploration or in the 
liberal and fine arts).13 Science, nature, and abstract 
ideas were thought to originate from God. According-
ly, natural discoveries were not thought to be human 
 
 13 See, e.g., Edward C. Walterscheid, The Nature of the 
Intellectual Property Clause: A Study in Historical Perspective 
365-66, 375-76 (William S. Hein & Co. 2002) (hereinafter 
“Walterscheid, Study”)); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the 
Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 1139, 1164-65 (1999). 
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creations that were the proper objects of exclusive 
private property rights.14 
 Further, scientists who made such discoveries 
were thought to owe moral duties to share their 
discoveries freely with the public, which was then 
entitled to benefit from the information. As Lord 
Camden stated in 1774, scientists are “intrusted by 
Providence with the delegated power of imparting to 
their fellow-creatures that instruction which heaven 
meant for universal benefit; they must not be niggards 
to the world, or hoard up for themselves the common 
stock.” 17 The Parliamentary History of England col. 
999 (William Cobbett ed., 1806-20) (1774). This 
perceived moral duty of scientists – which corre-
sponded with utilitarian beliefs of the social benefits 
of protecting the public domain – historically ground-
ed the prior art treatment of natural discoveries.15 
 
 14 See Christine MacLeod, Inventing the Industrial Revolu-
tion: The English Patent System 1660-1800, at 198-203 (Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 2002) (1988); Walterscheid, Study, supra, at 
39, 375-76. Cf. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 499 
U.S. 340, 347 (1991) (distinguishing “discovery” from “creation”; 
holding that facts cannot be original creations of their discover-
ers); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac MacPherson (Aug. 
13, 1813), in Thomas Jefferson, The Portable Thomas Jefferson 
525, at 529-30 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., Penguin Books 1977) 
(explaining why ideas are not subject to property rights). 
 15 See 1 Robinson, supra, § 25, at 39 (“To benefit by the 
discoveries of his fellow-men is thus not only a natural right, it 
is also the natural duty which every man owes to himself and to 
society; and the mutual, universal progress thence resulting is 
the fulfillment of the earthly destiny of the human race.”). See 
generally Sarnoff, supra, at 84-90. 
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Otherwise, as noted above, claims to uncreative appli-
cations would be able to partially monopolize natural 
discoveries. Cf. Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1293 (“monopoliza-
tion of those [basic] tools [of scientific and technologi-
cal work] through the grant of a patent might tend to 
impede innovation more than it would tend to pro-
mote it”). 
 This history is reflected in the Constitution’s 
language and purpose. As this Court has recognized, 
the Constitution requires originality for copyrights 
and patents, given authorization of exclusive rights 
only for “Authors and Inventors to their respective 
. . . Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, 
cl. 8.16 An original “Discovery” of an “Inventor” in the 
constitutional sense requires invention, which in turn 
requires a creative human advance beyond any new 
natural discovery. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron 
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (“discovery is some-
thing less than invention”); In re Kemper, 14 F. Cas. 
286, 287 (C.C. D. D.C. 1841) (No. 7,687) (“A discovery, 
in this sense, is not the subject of a patent” but as 
used in the Constitution is always “synonymous with 
invention.”); Rich, supra, at 29-34 (a qualitative 
 
 16 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 
340, 346 (1991) (“Originality is a constitutional requirement. . . . 
[In The Trade-Mark Cases, t]he Court explained that originality 
requires independent creation plus a modicum of creativity. . . . 
[In Burrow-Giles,] the Court emphasized the creative component 
of originality.”) (citing In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 
(1879), and Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 
53, 58 (1884)) (emphasis added). 
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“invention” requirement is reflected in the Constitu-
tion’s restriction to “Inventors”); Albert H. Walker, 
Text-book of the Patent Laws of the United States of 
America 2 (2d ed. 1889) (“The word ‘discovery’ . . . in 
the Constitution. . . . means invention . . . and . . . 
nothing else.”). Cf. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 220-
21 (1954) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Perhaps these 
are all ‘writings’ in the constitutional sense. But to 
me, at least, they are not obviously so. It is time that 
we came to the problem full face.”). See generally 
Oskar Liivak, The Forgotten Originality Requirement: 
A Constitutional Hurdle for Gene Patents, 87 J. Pat. 
& Trademark Off. Soc’y 261, 273-75 (2005). 
 Without reflecting an inventive concept that goes 
beyond (is not analogous to) an ineligible discovery, a 
claimed product or process will lack originality under 
the Constitution. Prior art treatment assures that 
uncreative applications or modifications of natural 
discoveries are not considered original inventions. No 
matter how much effort or creativity may have gone 
into identifying natural discoveries, the discoveries 
themselves and analogous applications or modifica-
tions of them simply are not within the constitutional 
grant of power. Cf. Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, 
17 F. Cas. 879, 884 (C.C. S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9,865) 
(“ ‘A discovery may be brilliant and useful, and not 
patentable. . . . The new force or principle brought to 
light . . . can be patented only in connection or com-
bination with the means by which, or the medium 
through which, it operates.’ ”) (emphasis added).  
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 The Court in this case should expressly hold that 
prior art treatment of ineligible discoveries is a 
constitutional requirement. Without such a clear 
statement of the Constitution’s limits, foreseeable 
lobbying may induce Congress to seek to validate 
retroactively (to a decision in this case) the thousands 
of ineligible gene patents that have issued. 
 
III. The Claimed Isolated DNA Molecules Are 
Ineligible, As Their Structure And Func-
tions Are At Most Analogous To Natural 
DNA And mRNA. 
 Given prior art treatment of natural discoveries, 
the claims at issue for isolated DNA molecules (and 
thousands of other patents’ claims for isolated and/or 
purified DNA) are clearly ineligible. The claimed 
molecules do not possess non-analogous (markedly 
different) structures or functions from the discovered, 
naturally occurring materials. For example, some of 
the claims at issue are drawn to “isolated DNA” 
molecules having a sequence “coding for a BRCA1 
polypeptide” (a protein) or containing “at least 15 
nucleotides” (DNA bases) of that sequence. U.S. 
Patent No. 5,747,282, cl. 1, 5. The discovered BRCA1 
gene and its location on the chromosome, the discov-
ered natural chromosomal DNA and mRNA mole-
cules, and the discovered natural chromosomal DNA 
and corresponding mRNA sequences all must be 
treated as prior art when evaluating whether the 
claimed “isolated DNA” molecules are inventions. It 
should be immediately apparent – however the claims 
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are construed – that the claimed isolated DNA mole-
cules do not have markedly different (non-analogous) 
structures from the natural DNA and mRNA on 
which they are based.17 
 It is precisely the identity of the claimed mole-
cules’ sequences to those of the discovered DNA and 
corresponding mRNA that makes such isolated DNA 
useful and valuable. The sequence identity clearly 
makes the claimed DNA molecules structurally 
analogous to the discovered natural chromosomal 
DNA and corresponding mRNA. This is true even if 
the claim term “isolated DNA” is construed – beyond 
the words themselves – to require minor differences 
in chemical structure (such as methylation) from 
naturally occurring DNA.18 Similarly, even if the 
claim term “isolated DNA” is construed to require 
synthetically created molecules,19 it would not make 
the claimed molecules markedly different. As noted 
above in regard to Cochrane, artificial production 
 
 17 All of the claimed fifteen-nucleotide DNA sequences will 
exist in chromosomal DNA without removing introns (although 
the chromosomal DNA sequences may not be “isolated” from the 
surrounding sequences). Similarly, the identified protein-coding 
sequences (with introns removed) will naturally exist in mRNA, 
which is not DNA but is subject to the genetic code. 
 18 See generally J. Sambrook et al., Molecular Cloning: A 
Laboratory Manual (2d ed. 1989). 
 19 Claims unlike those at issue here that are expressly 
limited to “cDNA” also will be ineligible, whether or not the term 
“cDNA” is construed to require synthetic production, precluding 
application to naturally occurring molecules. 
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alone is not sufficient for eligibility. This should be 
particularly true when artificial production merely 
reproduces the discovered natural molecules. See, 
e.g., Liivak, supra, at 282-90. 
 In fact, the claimed “isolated DNA” molecules 
(even if synthetically produced) may be structurally 
identical to natural materials. Because of natural 
viral transcription, both protein-coding-sequence and 
15-base-pair-sequence molecules may exist in nature 
separated from the chromosomal DNA material. 
Further, the claimed isolated DNA molecules may be 
identical even if chemically modified, given that 
chemical modification also may occur naturally 
(although statistically may not always occur in the 
same locations).20 
 It should also be apparent that “isolating” the 
specified DNA molecules is not a creative, non-
analogous inventive concept. Once the gene’s loca-
tion and the chromosomal DNA and corresponding 
mRNA molecules and sequences have been identi-
fied, determined, and treated as prior art, isolating 
and synthetically producing the relevant DNA mole-
cules is (and was at the relevant time) a wholly 
routine and conventional action.21 The claimed DNA 
 
 20 See, e.g., Yingying Zhang & Albert Jeltsch, The Applica-
tion of Next Generation Sequencing in DNA Methylation Analy-
sis, Genes 85, 86 (2010). 
 21 See, e.g., Sambrook, et al., supra. Further, both separa-
tion from chromosomes and synthetic production of the relevant 
sequences may occur in the very process of the scientific discovery 
(Continued on following page) 
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molecules at issue thus are not like the claimed 
bacteria at issue in Chakrabarty, which reflected a 
non-analogous combination (at least at the time).22 
 Nor are the functions of the claimed, isolated 
DNA molecules markedly different from (not analo-
gous to) those of the natural DNA on which they are 
based. The medical uses of the claimed isolated DNA 
molecules as diagnostics, and the scientific uses of 
them as probes or primers, depend upon and are 
directly analogous to the natural functions performed 
by chromosomal DNA and corresponding mRNA. 
These natural functions include the chemical and 
biological processes of homologous sequence binding 
and sequence replication.23 These functions are not 
inventive concepts, even if they are novel and valua-
ble analogous applications of the natural discoveries. 
These functions depend on the natural discoveries at 
 
of the gene sequence, demonstrating the lack of creative advance 
beyond the discovery. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Law 
Professor Christopher M. Holman in Support of Neither Party, 
Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), at 6-7. 
 22 In Chakrabarty, the Court focused on the question of 
whether Congress had prohibited claims to living organisms, not 
on the question of invention itself. See 447 U.S. at 310-18. 
Nevertheless, the Court distinguished the combination in Funk 
Brothers by noting the markedly different character of the 
combination at issue, and held its decision was consistent with 
Flook. See id. at 310, 315. The Court did not reach the eligibility 
of a claim to a more analogous, purified natural product, as the 
issue had been mooted. See id. at 306-07. 
 23 See generally Sambrook, et al., supra. 
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least as much as the discovered mutual inhibition 
properties of the combined bacterial strains in Funk 
Brothers and the discovered food preserving function 
of borax and edible nature of fruit in American Fruit 
Growers. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should 
affirm the District Court’s rejection of the patent 
claims at issue, adopt the non-analogous structure 
and function (marked differences) test of an inventive 
concept, and hold that prior art treatment of ineligi-
ble discoveries is a constitutional requirement. 
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